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NOTICE: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the
preliminary print of the United States Reports.  Readers are requested to
notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Court of the United States, Wash-
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SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
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No. 92-757
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BARBARA LANDGRAF, PETITIONER v. USI FILM
PRODUCTS et al.
on writ of certiorari to the united states court
of appeals for the fifth circuit
[April 26, 1994]

  Justice Stevens delivered the opinion of the Court.
  The Civil Rights Act of 1991 (1991 Act or Act) creates
a right to recover compensatory and punitive damages
for certain violations of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act
of 1964.  See Rev. Stat. 1977A(a), 42 U. S. C.
1981a(a), as added by 102 of the 1991 Act, Pub. L.
102-166, 105 Stat. 1071.  The Act further provides that
any party may demand a trial by jury if such damages
are sought.  We granted certiorari to decide whether
these provisions apply to a Title VII case that was
pending on appeal when the statute was enacted.  We
hold that they do not.

                            I
  From September 4, 1984, through January 17, 1986,
petitioner Barbara Landgraf was employed in the USI
Film Products (USI) plant in Tyler, Texas.  She worked
the 11 p.m. to 7 a.m. shift operating a machine that
produced plastic bags.  A fellow employee named John

Williams repeatedly harassed her with inappropriate
remarks and physical contact.  Petitioner's complaints to
her immediate supervisor brought her no relief, but
when she reported the incidents to the personnel
manager, he conducted an investigation, reprimanded
Williams, and transferred him to another department.
Four days later petitioner quit her job.
  Petitioner filed a timely charge with the Equal
Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC or Com-
mission).  The Commission determined that petitioner
had likely been the victim of sexual harassment creating
a hostile work environment in violation of Title VII of
the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U. S. C. 2000e et seq.,
but concluded that her employer had adequately reme-
died the violation.  Accordingly, the Commission dis-
missed the charge and issued a notice of right to sue.
  On July 21, 1989, petitioner commenced this action
against USI, its corporate owner, and that company's
successor-in-interest.  After a bench trial, the District
Court found that Williams had sexually harassed
petitioner causing her to suffer mental anguish.
However, the court concluded that she had not been
constructively discharged.  The court said:
      -Although the harassment was serious enough to
establish that a hostile work environment existed for
Landgraf, it was not so severe that a reasonable
person would have felt compelled to resign.  This is
particularly true in light of the fact that at the time
Landgraf resigned from her job, USI had taken steps
. . . to eliminate the hostile working environment
arising from the sexual harassment.  Landgraf
voluntarily resigned from her employment with USI
for reasons unrelated to the sexual harassment in
question.-  App. to Pet. for Cert. B-3-4.
Because the court found that petitioner's employment
was not terminated in violation of Title VII, she was not
entitled to equitable relief, and because Title VII did not
then authorize any other form of relief, the court
dismissed her complaint.
  On November 21, 1991, while petitioner's appeal was
pending, the President signed into law the Civil Rights
Act of 1991.  The Court of Appeals rejected petitioner's
argument that her case should be remanded for a jury
trial on damages pursuant to the 1991 Act.  Its decision
not to remand rested on the premise that -a court must
`apply the law in effect at the time it renders its
decision, unless doing so would result in manifest
injustice or there is statutory direction or legislative
history to the contrary.'  Bradley [v. Richmond School
Bd., 416 U. S. 696, 711 (1974)].-  968 F. 2d 427, 432
(CA 5 1992).  Commenting first on the provision for a
jury trial in 102(c), the court stated that requiring the
defendant -to retry this case because of a statutory
change enacted after the trial was completed would be
an injustice and a waste of judicial resources.  We apply
procedural rules to pending cases, but we do not
invalidate procedures followed before the new rule was
adopted.-  968 F. 2d, at 432-433.  The court then
characterized the provision for compensatory and
punitive damages in 102 as -a seachange in employer
liability for Title VII violations- and concluded that it
would be unjust to apply this kind of additional and
unforeseeable obligation to conduct occurring before the
effective date of the Act.  Ibid.  Finding no clear error
in the District Court's factual findings, the Court of
Appeals affirmed the judgment for respondents.
  We granted certiorari and set the case for argument
with Rivers v. Roadway Express, Inc., post, at ___.  Our
order limited argument to the question whether 102 of
the 1991 Act applies to cases pending when it became
law.  507 U. S. ___ (1993).  Accordingly, for purposes of
our decision, we assume that the District Court and the
Court of Appeals properly applied the law in effect at
the time of the discriminatory conduct and that the
relevant findings of fact were correct.  We therefore
assume that petitioner was the victim of sexual harass-
ment violative of Title VII, but that the law did not
then authorize any recovery of damages even though she
was injured.  We also assume, arguendo, that if the
same conduct were to occur today, petitioner would be
entitled to a jury trial and that the jury might find that
she was constructively discharged, or that her mental
anguish or other injuries would support an award of
damages against her former employer.  Thus, the
controlling question is whether the Court of Appeals
should have applied the law in effect at the time the
discriminatory conduct occurred, or at the time of its
decision in July 1992.
                           II
  Petitioner's primary submission is that the text of the
1991 Act requires that it be applied to cases pending on
its enactment.   Her argument, if accepted, would make
the entire Act (with two narrow exceptions) applicable to
conduct that occurred, and to cases that were filed,
before the Act's effective date.  Although only 102 is at
issue in this case, we therefore preface our analysis with
a brief description of the scope of the 1991 Act.
  The Civil Rights Act of 1991 is in large part a
response to a series of decisions of this Court interpret-
ing the Civil Rights Acts of 1866 and 1964.  Section 3(4)
expressly identifies as one of the Act's purposes -to
respond to recent decisions of the Supreme Court by
expanding the scope of relevant civil rights statutes in
order to provide adequate protection to victims of
discrimination.-  That section, as well as a specific
finding in 2(2), identifies Wards Cove Packing Co. v.
Atonio, 490 U. S. 642 (1989), as a decision that gave
rise to special concerns.  Section 105 of the Act,
entitled -Burden of Proof in Disparate Impact Cases,- is
a direct response to Wards Cove.
  Other sections of the Act were obviously drafted with
-recent decisions of the Supreme Court- in mind.  Thus,
101 (which is at issue in Rivers, post, at ___) amended
the 1866 Civil Rights Act's prohibition of racial discrimi-
nation in the -mak[ing] and enforce[ment] [of] contracts,-
42 U. S. C. 1981 (1988 ed., Supp. III), in response to
Patterson v. McLean Credit Union, 491 U. S. 164 (1989);
107 responds to Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U. S.
228 (1989), by setting forth standards applicable in
-mixed motive- cases; 108 responds to Martin v. Wilks,
490 U. S. 755 (1989), by prohibiting certain challenges
to employment practices implementing consent decrees;
109 responds to EEOC v. Arabian American Oil Co.,
499 U. S. 244 (1991), by redefining the term -employee-
as used in Title VII to include certain United States
citizens working in foreign countries for United States
employers; 112 responds to Lorance v. AT&T Technolo-
gies, Inc., 490 U. S. 900 (1989), by expanding employees'
rights to challenge discriminatory seniority systems;
113 responds to West Virginia Univ. Hospitals, Inc. v.
Casey, 499 U. S. 83 (1991), by providing that an award
of attorney's fees may include expert fees; and 114
responds to Library of Congress v. Shaw, 478 U. S. 310
(1986), by allowing interest on judgments against the
United States.
  A number of important provisions in the Act, however,
were not responses to Supreme Court decisions.  For
example, 106 enacts a new prohibition against adjust-
ing test scores -on the basis of race, color, religion, sex,
or national origin-; 117 extends the coverage of Title
VII to include the House of Representatives and certain
employees of the Legislative Branch; and 301-325
establish special procedures to protect Senate employees
from discrimination.  Among the provisions that did not
directly respond to any Supreme Court decision is the
one at issue in this case, 102.
  Entitled -Damages in Cases of Intentional Discrimina-
tion,- 102 provides in relevant part:
-(a)  Right of Recovery.-
      -(1) Civil Rights.-In an action brought by a
complaining party under section 706 or 717 of the
Civil Rights Act of 1964 (42 U. S. C. 2000e-5)
against a respondent who engaged in unlawful
intentional discrimination (not an employment
practice that is unlawful because of its disparate
impact) prohibited under section 703, 704, or 717 of
the Act (42 U. S. C. 2000e-2 or 2000e-3), and
provided that the complaining party cannot recover
under section 1977 of the Revised Statutes (42 U. S.
C. 1981), the complaining party may recover com-
pensatory and punitive damages . . . in addition to
any relief authorized by section 706(g) of the Civil
Rights Act of 1964, from the respondent.
             .        .        .       .        .
-(c)   Jury Trial.-If a complaining party seeks
compensatory or punitive damages under this
section-
      -(1) any party may demand a trial by jury.-

  Before the enactment of the 1991 Act, Title VII
afforded only -equitable- remedies.  The primary form of
monetary relief available was backpay.  Title VII's back
pay remedy, modeled on that of the National Labor
Relations Act, 29 U. S. C. 160(c), is a -make-whole-
remedy that resembles compensatory damages in some
respects.  See Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U. S.
405, 418-422 (1975).  However, the new compensatory
damages provision of the 1991 Act is -in addition to,-
and does not replace or duplicate, the backpay remedy
allowed under prior law.  Indeed, to prevent double
recovery, the 1991 Act provides that compensatory
damages -shall not include backpay, interest on backpay,
or any other type of relief authorized under section
706(g) of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.-  102(b)(2).
  Section 102 significantly expands the monetary relief
potentially available to plaintiffs who would have been
entitled to backpay under prior law.  Before 1991, for
example, monetary relief for a discriminatorily dis-
charged employee generally included -only an amount
equal to the wages the employee would have earned
from the date of discharge to the date of reinstatement,
along with lost fringe benefits such as vacation pay and
pension benefits.-  United States v. Burke, 504 U. S. ___,
___  (1992) (slip op., at 9-10).  Under 102, however, a
Title VII plaintiff who wins a backpay award may also
seek compensatory damages for -future pecuniary losses,
emotional pain, suffering, inconvenience, mental anguish,
loss of enjoyment of life, and other nonpecuniary losses.-
102(b)(3).  In addition, when it is shown that the
employer acted -with malice or with reckless indifference
to the [plaintiff's] federally protected rights,- 102(b)(1),
a plaintiff may recover punitive damages.
  Section 102 also allows monetary relief for some forms
of workplace discrimination that would not previously
have justified any relief under Title VII.  As this case
illustrates, even if unlawful discrimination was proved,
under prior law a Title VII plaintiff could not recover
monetary relief unless the discrimination was also found
to have some concrete effect on the plaintiff's employ-
ment status, such as a denied promotion, a differential
in compensation, or termination.  See Burke, supra, at
___ (slip op., at 10-11).  (-[T]he circumscribed remedies
available under Title VII [before the 1991 Act] stand in
marked contrast not only to those available under
traditional tort law, but under other federal anti-
discrimination statutes, as well-).  Section 102, however,
allows a plaintiff to recover in circumstances in which
there has been unlawful discrimination in the -terms,
conditions, or privileges of employment,- 42 U. S. C.
2000e-2(a)(1), even though the discrimination did not
involve a discharge or a loss of pay.  In short, to further
Title VII's -central statutory purposes of eradicating
discrimination throughout the economy and making
persons whole for injuries suffered through past discrim-
ination,- Albemarle Paper Co., 422 U. S., at 421, 102 of
the 1991 Act effects a major expansion in the relief
available to victims of employment discrimination.
  In 1990, a comprehensive civil rights bill passed both
Houses of Congress.  Although similar to the 1991 Act
in many other respects, the 1990 bill differed in that it
contained language expressly calling for application of
many of its provisions, including the section providing
for damages in cases of intentional employment discrimi-
nation, to cases arising before its (expected) enactment.
The President vetoed the 1990 legislation, however,
citing the bill's -unfair retroactivity rules- as one reason
for his disapproval.  Congress narrowly failed to
override the veto.  See 136 Cong. Rec. S16589 (Oct. 24,
1990) (66-34 Senate vote in favor of override).
  The absence of comparable language in the 1991 Act
cannot realistically be attributed to oversight or to
unawareness of the retroactivity issue.  Rather, it seems
likely that one of the compromises that made it possible
to enact the 1991 version was an agreement not to
include the kind of explicit retroactivity command found
in the 1990 bill.
  The omission of the elaborate retroactivity provision of
the 1990 bill-which was by no means the only source
of political controversy over that legislation-is not
dispositive because it does not tell us precisely where
the compromise was struck in the 1991 Act.  The
Legislature might, for example, have settled in 1991 on
a less expansive form of retroactivity that, unlike the
1990 bill, did not reach cases already finally decided.
See n. 8 supra.  A decision to reach only cases still
pending might explain Congress' failure to provide in the
1991 Act, as it had in 1990, that certain sections would
apply to proceedings pending on specific preenactment
dates.  Our first question, then, is whether the statutory
text on which petitioner relies manifests an intent that
the 1991 Act should be applied to cases that arose and
went to trial before its enactment.

                           III
  Petitioner's textual argument relies on three provisions
of the 1991 Act: 402(a), 402(b), and 109(c).  Section
402(a), the only provision of the Act that speaks directly
to the question before us, states:
      -Except as otherwise specifically provided, this Act
and the amendments made by this Act shall take
effect upon enactment.-
That language does not, by itself, resolve the question
before us.  A statement that a statute will become
effective on a certain date does not even arguably
suggest that it has any application to conduct that
occurred at an earlier date.  Petitioner does not argue
otherwise.  Rather, she contends that the introductory
clause of 402(a) would be superfluous unless it refers
to 402(b) and 109(c), which provide for prospective
application in limited contexts.
  The parties agree that 402(b) was intended to exempt
a single disparate impact lawsuit against the Wards
Cove Packing Company.  Section 402(b) provides:
      -(b) Certain Disparate Impact Cases.-
Notwithstanding any other provision of this Act,
nothing in this Act shall apply to any disparate
impact case for which a complaint was filed before
March 1, 1975, and for which an initial decision was
rendered after October 30, 1983.-
Section 109(c), part of the section extending Title VII to
overseas employers, states:
      -(c) Application of Amendments.-The amend-
ments made by this section shall not apply with
respect to conduct occurring before the date of the
enactment of this Act.-
According to petitioner, these two subsections are the
-other provisions- contemplated in the first clause of
402(a), and together create a strong negative inference
that all sections of the Act not specifically declared
prospective apply to pending cases that arose before
November 21, 1991.
  Before addressing the particulars of petitioner's
argument, we observe that she places extraordinary
weight on two comparatively minor and narrow provi-
sions in a long and complex statute.  Applying the
entire Act to cases arising from preenactment conduct
would have important consequences, including the
possibility that trials completed before its enactment
would need to be retried and the possibility that
employers would be liable for punitive damages for
conduct antedating the Act's enactment.   Purely
prospective application, on the other hand, would prolong
the life of a remedial scheme, and of judicial construc-
tions of civil rights statutes, that Congress obviously
found wanting.  Given the high stakes of the retroactiv-
ity question, the broad coverage of the statute, and the
prominent and specific retroactivity provisions in the
1990 bill, it would be surprising for Congress to have
chosen to resolve that question through negative infer-
ences drawn from two provisions of quite limited effect.
  Petitioner, however, invokes the canon that a court
should give effect to every provision of a statute and
thus avoid redundancy among different provisions.  See,
e.g., Mackey v. Lanier Collection Agency & Service, Inc.,
486 U. S. 825, 837, and n. 11 (1988).  Unless the word
-otherwise- in 402(a) refers to either 402(b) or 109(c),
she contends, the first five words in 402(a) are entirely
superfluous.  Moreover, relying on the canon  -[e]xpressio
unius est exclusio alterius,- see Leatherman v. Tarrant
County Narcotics Intelligence and Coordination Unit, 509
U. S. ___, ___ (1993) (slip op., at 5), petitioner argues
that because Congress provided specifically for
prospectivity in two places (109(c) and 402(b)), we
should infer that it intended the opposite for the
remainder of the statute.
  Petitioner emphasizes that 402(a) begins: -Except as
otherwise specifically provided.-  A scan of the statute
for other -specific provisions- concerning effective dates
reveals that 402(b) and 109(c) are the most likely
candidates.  Since those provisions decree prospectivity,
and since 402(a) tells us that the specific provisions are
exceptions, 402(b) should be considered as prescribing
a general rule of retroactivity.  Petitioner's argument
has some force, but we find it most unlikely that
Congress intended the introductory clause to carry the
critically important meaning petitioner assigns it.  Had
Congress wished 402(a) to have such a determinate
meaning, it surely would have used language comparable
to its reference to the predecessor Title VII damages
provisions in the 1990 legislation:  that the new provi-
sions -shall apply to all proceedings pending on or
commenced after the date of enactment of this Act.-  S.
2104, 101st Cong., 1st Sess. 15(a)(4) (1990).
  It is entirely possible that Congress inserted the
-otherwise specifically provided- language not because it
understood the -takes effect- clause to establish a rule
of retroactivity to which only two -other specific provi-
sions- would be exceptions, but instead to assure that
any specific timing provisions in the Act would prevail
over the general -take effect on enactment- command.
The drafters of a complicated piece of legislation contain-
ing more than 50 separate sections may well have
inserted the -except as otherwise provided- language
merely to avoid the risk of an inadvertent conflict in the
statute.  If the introductory clause of 402(a) was
intended to refer specifically to 402(b), 109(c), or both,
it is difficult to understand why the drafters chose the
word -otherwise- rather than either or both of the
appropriate section numbers.
  We are also unpersuaded by petitioner's argument that
both 402(b) and 109(c) merely duplicate the -take
effect upon enactment- command of 402(a) unless all
other provisions, including the damages provisions of
102, apply to pending cases.  That argument depends
on the assumption that all those other provisions must
be treated uniformly for purposes of their application to
pending cases based on preenactment conduct.  That
thesis, however, is by no means an inevitable one.  It is
entirely possible-indeed, highly probable-that, because
it was unable to resolve the retroactivity issue with the
clarity of the 1990 legislation, Congress viewed the
matter as an open issue to be resolved by the courts.
Our precedents on retroactivity left doubts about what
default rule would apply in the absence of congressional
guidance, and suggested that some provisions might
apply to cases arising before enactment while others
might not.  Compare Bowen v. Georgetown Univ.
Hospital, 488 U. S. 204 (1988) with Bradley v. Richmond
School Bd., 416 U. S. 696 (1974).  See also Bennett v.
New Jersey, 470 U. S. 632 (1985).  The only matters
Congress did not leave to the courts were set out with
specificity in 109(c) and 402(b).  Congressional doubt
concerning judicial retroactivity doctrine, coupled with
the likelihood that the routine -take effect upon enact-
ment- language would require courts to fall back upon
that doctrine, provide a plausible explanation for both
402(b) and 109(c) that makes neither provision
redundant.
  Turning to the text of 402(b), it seems unlikely that
the introductory phrase (-Notwithstanding any other
provision of this Act-) was meant to refer to the immedi-
ately preceding subsection.  Since petitioner does not
contend that any other provision speaks to the general
effective date issue, the logic of her argument requires
us to interpret that phrase to mean nothing more than
-Notwithstanding 402(a).-  Petitioner's textual argument
assumes that the drafters selected the indefinite word
-otherwise- in 402(a) to identify two specific subsections
and the even more indefinite term -any other provision-
in 402(b) to refer to nothing more than 402(b)'s next-
door neighbor-402(a).  Here again, petitioner's statu-
tory argument would require us to assume that Congress
chose a surprisingly indirect route to convey an impor-
tant and easily expressed message concerning the Act's
effect on pending cases.
  The relevant legislative history of the 1991 Act
reinforces our conclusion that 402(a), 109(c) and 402(b)
cannot bear the weight petitioner places upon them.
The 1991 bill as originally introduced in the House
contained explicit retroactivity provisions similar to those
found in the 1990 bill.  However, the Senate substi-
tute that was agreed upon omitted those explicit ret-
roactivity provisions.  The legislative history discloses
some frankly partisan statements about the meaning of
the final effective date language, but those statements
cannot plausibly be read as reflecting any general
agreement.  The history reveals no evidence that
Members believed that an agreement had been tacitly
struck on the controversial retroactivity issue, and little
to suggest that Congress understood or intended the
interplay of 402(a), 402(b) and 109(c) to have the
decisive effect petitioner assigns them.  Instead, the
history of the 1991 Act conveys the impression that
legislators agreed to disagree about whether and to what
extent the Act would apply to preenactment conduct.
  Although the passage of the 1990 bill may indicate
that a majority of the 1991 Congress also favored
retroactive application, even the will of the majority does
not become law unless it follows the path charted in
Article I, 7, cl. 2 of the Constitution.  See INS v.
Chadha, 462 U. S. 919, 946-951 (1983).   In the absence
of the kind of unambiguous directive found in 15 of the
1990 bill, we must look elsewhere for guidance on
whether 102 applies to this case.

                           IV
  It is not uncommon to find -apparent tension- between
different canons of statutory construction.  As Professor
Llewellyn famously illustrated, many of the traditional
canons have equal opposites.  In order to resolve the
question left open by the 1991 Act, federal courts have
labored to reconcile two seemingly contradictory state-
ments found in our decisions concerning the effect of
intervening changes in the law.  Each statement is
framed as a generally applicable rule for interpreting
statutes that do not specify their temporal reach.  The
first is the rule that -a court is to apply the law in
effect at the time it renders its decision,- Bradley, 416
U. S., at 711.  The second is the axiom that
-[r]etroactivity is not favored in the law,- and its
interpretive corollary that -congressional enactments and
administrative rules will not be construed to have
retroactive effect unless their language requires this
result.- Bowen, 488 U. S., at 208.
  We have previously noted the -apparent tension-
between those expressions.  See Kaiser Aluminum &
Chemical Corp. v. Bonjorno, 494 U. S. 827, 837 (1990);
see also Bennett, 470 U. S., at 639-640.  We found it
unnecessary in Kaiser to resolve that seeming conflict
-because under either view, where the congressional
intent is clear, it governs,- and the prejudgment interest
statute at issue in that case evinced -clear congressional
intent- that it was -not applicable to judgments entered
before its effective date.-  499 U. S., at 837-838.  In the
case before us today, however, we have concluded that
the Civil Rights Act of 1991 does not evince any clear
expression of intent on 102's application to cases
arising before the Act's enactment.  We must, therefore,
focus on the apparent tension between the rules we have
espoused for handling similar problems in the absence
of an instruction from Congress.
  We begin by noting that there is no tension between
the holdings in Bradley and Bowen, both of which were
unanimous decisions.  Relying on another unanimous
decision-Thorpe v. Housing Authority of Durham, 393
U. S. 268 (1969)-we held in Bradley that a statute
authorizing the award of attorney's fees to successful
civil rights plaintiffs applied in a case that was pending
on appeal at the time the statute was enacted.  Bowen
held that the Department of Health and Human Services
lacked statutory authority to promulgate a rule requiring
private hospitals to refund Medicare payments for
services rendered before promulgation of the rule.  Our
opinion in Bowen did not purport to overrule Bradley or
to limit its reach.  In this light, we turn to the -appar-
ent tension- between the two canons mindful of another
canon of unquestionable vitality, the -maxim not to be
disregarded that general expressions, in every opinion,
are to be taken in connection with the case in which
those expressions are used.-  Cohens v. Virginia, 6
Wheat. 264, 399 (1821).

                            A
  As Justice Scalia has demonstrated, the presumption
against retroactive legislation is deeply rooted in our
jurisprudence, and embodies a legal doctrine centuries
older than our Republic.  Elementary considerations
of fairness dictate that individuals should have an
opportunity to know what the law is and to conform
their conduct accordingly; settled expectations should not
be lightly disrupted.  For that reason, the -principle
that the legal effect of conduct should ordinarily be
assessed under the law that existed when the conduct
took place has timeless and universal appeal.- Kaiser,
494 U. S., at 855 (Scalia, J., concurring).  In a free,
dynamic society, creativity in both commercial and
artistic endeavors is fostered by a rule of law that gives
people confidence about the legal consequences of their
actions.
  It is therefore not surprising that the antiretroactivity
principle finds expression in several provisions of our
Constitution.  The Ex Post Facto Clause flatly prohibits
retroactive application of penal legislation.   Article
I, 10, cl. 1 prohibits States from passing another type
of retroactive legislation, laws -impairing the Obligation
of Contracts.-  The Fifth Amendment's Takings Clause
prevents the Legislature (and other government actors)
from depriving private persons of vested property rights
except for a -public use- and upon payment of -just
compensation.-  The prohibitions on -Bills of Attainder-
in Art. I, 9-10, prohibit legislatures from singling out
disfavored persons and meting out summary punishment
for past conduct.  See, e.g., United States v. Brown, 381
U. S. 437, 456-462 (1965).  The Due Process Clause also
protects the interests in fair notice and repose that may
be compromised by retroactive legislation; a justification
sufficient to validate a statute's prospective application
under the Clause -may not suffice- to warrant its
retroactive application.  Usery v. Turner Elkhorn Mining
Co., 428 U. S. 1, 17 (1976).
  These provisions demonstrate that retroactive statutes
raise particular concerns.  The Legislature's unmatched
powers allow it to sweep away settled expectations
suddenly and without individualized consideration.  Its
responsivity to political pressures poses a risk that it
may be tempted to use retroactive legislation as a means
of retribution against unpopular groups or individuals.
As Justice Marshall observed in his opinion for the
Court in Weaver v. Graham, 450 U. S. 24 (1981), the Ex
Post Facto Clause not only ensures that individuals have
-fair warning- about the effect of criminal statutes, but
also -restricts governmental power by restraining
arbitrary and potentially vindictive legislation.- Id., at
28-29 (citations omitted).
  The Constitution's restrictions, of course, are of limited
scope.  Absent a violation of one of those specific provi-
sions, the potential unfairness of retroactive civil legisla-
tion is not a sufficient reason for a court to fail to give
a statute its intended scope.  Retroactivity provisions
often serve entirely benign and legitimate purposes,
whether to respond to emergencies, to correct mistakes,
to prevent circumvention of a new statute in the interval
immediately preceding its passage, or simply to give
comprehensive effect to a new law Congress considers
salutary.  However, a requirement that Congress first
make its intention clear helps ensure that Congress
itself has determined that the benefits of retroactivity
outweigh the potential for disruption or unfairness.
  While statutory retroactivity has long been disfavored,
deciding when a statute operates -retroactively- is not
always a simple or mechanical task.  Sitting on Circuit,
Justice Story offered an influential definition in Society
for Propagation of the Gospel v. Wheeler, 22 F. Cas. 756
(No. 13,156) (CCDNH 1814), a case construing a provi-
sion of the New Hampshire Constitution that broadly
prohibits -retrospective- laws both criminal and civil.
Justice Story first rejected the notion that the provision
bars only explicitly retroactive legislation, i.e., -statutes
. . . enacted to take effect from a time anterior to their
passage[.]-  Id., at 767.   Such a construction, he
concluded, would be -utterly subversive of all the
objects- of the prohibition.  Ibid.  Instead, the ban on
retrospective legislation embraced -all statutes, which,
though operating only from their passage, affect vested
rights and past transactions.-  Ibid.  -Upon principle,-
Justice Story elaborated,
-every statute, which takes away or impairs vested
rights acquired under existing laws, or creates a
new obligation, imposes a new duty, or attaches a
new disability, in respect to transactions or consid-
erations already past, must be deemed retrospective
. . . .-  Ibid. (citing Calder v. Bull, 3 Dall. 386
(1798) and Dash v. Van Kleek, 7 Johns. 477 (N. Y.
1811)).
Though the formulas have varied, similar functional
conceptions of legislative -retroactivity- have found voice
in this Court's decisions and elsewhere.
  A statute does not operate -retrospectively- merely
because it is applied in a case arising from conduct
antedating the statute's enactment, see Republic Nat.
Bank of Miami v. United States, 506 U. S. ___, ___
(1992) (slip op., at 2) (Thomas, J., concurring in part
and concurring in judgment), or upsets expectations
based in prior law.  Rather, the court must ask
whether the new provision attaches new legal conse-
quences to events completed before its enactment.  The
conclusion that a particular rule operates -retroactively-
comes at the end of a process of judgment concerning
the nature and extent of the change in the law and the
degree of connection between the operation of the new
rule and a relevant past event.  Any test of retroactivity
will leave room for disagreement in hard cases, and is
unlikely to classify the enormous variety of legal
changes with perfect philosophical clarity.  However,
retroactivity is a matter on which judges tend to have
-sound . . . instinct[s],-  see Danforth v. Groton Water
Co., 178 Mass. 472, 476, 59 N. E. 1033, 1034 (1901)
(Holmes, J.), and familiar considerations of fair notice,
reasonable reliance, and settled expectations offer sound
guidance.
  Since the early days of this Court, we have declined
to give retroactive effect to statutes burdening private
rights unless Congress had made clear its intent.  Thus,
in United States v. Heth, 3 Cranch 399 (1806), we
refused to apply a federal statute reducing the commis-
sions of customs collectors to collections commenced
before the statute's enactment because the statute lacked
-clear, strong, and imperative- language requiring
retroactive application, id. at 413 (opinion of Paterson,
J.).  The presumption against statutory retroactivity has
consistently been explained by reference to the unfair-
ness of imposing new burdens on persons after the fact.
Indeed, at common law a contrary rule applied to
statutes that merely removed a burden on private rights
by repealing a penal provision (whether criminal or
civil); such repeals were understood to preclude punish-
ment for acts antedating the repeal.  See, e.g., United
States v. Chambers, 291 U. S. 217, 223-224 (1934); Gulf,
C. & S. F. R. Co. v. Dennis, 224 U. S. 503, 506 (1912);
United States v. Tynen, 11 Wall. 88, 93-95 (1871);
Norris v. Crocker, 13 How. 429, 440-441 (1852); Mary-
land v. Baltimore & Ohio R. Co., 3 How. 534, 552
(1845);  Yeaton v. United States, 5 Cranch 281, 284
(1809).  But see 1 U. S. C. 109 (repealing common-law
rule).
  The largest category of cases in which we have applied
the presumption against statutory retroactivity has
involved new provisions affecting contractual or property
rights, matters in which predictability and stability are
of prime importance.  The presumption has not,
however, been limited to such cases.  At issue in Chew
Heong v. United States, 112 U. S. 536 (1884), for
example, was a provision of the -Chinese Restriction
Act- of 1882 barring Chinese laborers from reentering
the United States without a certificate prepared when
they exited this country.  We held that the statute did
not bar the reentry of a laborer who had left the United
States before the certification requirement was promul-
gated.  Justice Harlan's opinion for the Court observed
that the law in effect before the 1882 enactment had
accorded laborers a right to re-enter without a certifi-
cate, and invoked the -uniformly- accepted rule against
-giv[ing] to statutes a retrospective operation, whereby
rights previously vested are injuriously affected, unless
compelled to do so by language so clear and positive as
to leave no room to doubt that such was the intention
of the legislature.-  Id., at 559.
  Our statement in Bowen that -congressional enact-
ments and administrative rules will not be construed to
have retroactive effect unless their language requires
this result,-  488 U. S., at 208, was in step with this
long line of cases.  Bowen itself was a paradigmatic
case of retroactivity in which a federal agency sought to
recoup, under cost limit regulations issued in 1984,
funds that had been paid to hospitals for services
rendered earlier, see id., at 207; our search for clear
congressional intent authorizing retroactivity was con-
sistent with the approach taken in decisions spanning
two centuries.
  The presumption against statutory retroactivity had
special force in the era in which courts tended to view
legislative interference with property and contract rights
circumspectly.  In this century, legislation has come to
supply the dominant means of legal ordering, and
circumspection has given way to greater deference to
legislative judgments.  See Usery v. Turner Elkhorn
Mining Co., 428 U. S., at 15-16; Home Bldg. & Loan
Assn. v. Blaisdell, 290 U. S. 398, 436-444 (1934).  But
while the constitutional impediments to retroactive civil
legislation are now modest, prospectivity remains the
appropriate default rule.  Because it accords with widely
held intuitions about how statutes ordinarily operate, a
presumption against retroactivity will generally coincide
with legislative and public expectations.  Requiring clear
intent assures that Congress itself has affirmatively
considered the potential unfairness of retroactive
application and determined that it is an acceptable price
to pay for the countervailing benefits.  Such a require-
ment allocates to Congress responsibility for funda-
mental policy judgments concerning the proper temporal
reach of statutes, and has the additional virtue of giving
legislators a predictable background rule against which
to legislate.

                            B
  Although we have long embraced a presumption
against statutory retroactivity, for just as long we have
recognized that, in many situations, a court should
-apply the law in effect at the time it renders its
decision,- Bradley, 416 U. S., at 711, even though that
law was enacted after the events that gave rise to the
suit.  There is, of course, no conflict between that princi-
ple and a presumption against retroactivity when the
statute in question is unambiguous.  Chief Justice
Marshall's opinion in United States v. Schooner Peggy,
1 Cranch 103 (1801), illustrates this point.  Because a
treaty signed on September 30, 1800, while the case was
pending on appeal, unambiguously provided for the
restoration of captured property -not yet definitively
condemned,- id., at 107 (emphasis in original), we
reversed a decree entered on September 23, 1800,
condemning a French vessel that had been seized in
American waters.  Our application of -the law in effect-
at the time of our decision in Schooner Peggy was
simply a response to the language of the statute.  Id., at
109.
  Even absent specific legislative authorization, applica-
tion of new statutes passed after the events in suit is
unquestionably proper in many situations.  When the
intervening statute authorizes or affects the propriety of
prospective relief, application of the new provision is not
retroactive.  Thus, in American Steel Foundries v. Tri-
City Central Trades Council, 257 U. S. 184 (1921), we
held that 20 of the Clayton Act, enacted while the case
was pending on appeal, governed the propriety of
injunctive relief against labor picketing.  In remanding
the suit for application of the intervening statute, we
observed that -relief by injunction operates in futuro,-
and that the plaintiff had no -vested right- in the decree
entered by the trial court.  257 U. S., at 201.  See also,
e.g., Hall v. Beals, 396 U. S. 45, 48 (1969); Duplex
Printing Press Co. v. Deering, 254 U. S. 443, 464 (1921).
  We have regularly applied intervening statutes
conferring or ousting jurisdiction, whether or not
jurisdiction lay when the underlying conduct occurred or
when the suit was filed.  Thus, in Bruner v. United
States, 343 U. S. 112, 116-117 (1952), relying on our
-consisten[t]- practice, we ordered an action dismissed
because the jurisdictional statute under which it had
been (properly) filed was subsequently repealed.  See
also Hallowell v. Commons, 239 U. S. 506, 508-509
(1916); The Assessors v. Osbornes, 9 Wall. 567, 575
(1870).  Conversely, in Andrus v. Charlestone Stone
Products Co., 436 U. S. 604, 607-608, n. 6 (1978), we
held that, because a statute passed while the case was
pending on appeal had eliminated the amount-in-contro-
versy requirement for federal question cases, the fact
that respondent had failed to allege $10,000 in contro-
versy at the commencement of the action was -now of no
moment.-  See also  United States v. Alabama, 362
U. S. 602, 604 (1960) (per curiam); Stephens v. Cherokee
Nation, 174 U. S. 445, 478 (1899).  Application of a new
jurisdictional rule usually -takes away no substantive
right but simply changes the tribunal that is to hear the
case.-  Hallowell, 239 U. S., at 508.  Present law
normally governs in such situtations because jurisdic-
tional statutes -speak to the power of the court rather
than to the rights or obligations of the parties,- Republic
Nat. Bank of Miami, 506 U. S., at ___ (slip op., at 2)
(Thomas, J., concurring).
  Changes in procedural rules may often be applied in
suits arising before their enactment without raising
concerns about retroactivity.  For example, in Ex parte
Collett, 337 U. S. 55, 71 (1949), we held that 28
U. S. C. 1404(a) governed the transfer of an action
instituted prior to that statute's enactment.  We noted
the diminished reliance interests in matters of proce-
dure.  Id., at 71.  Because rules of procedure regulate
secondary rather than primary conduct, the fact that a
new procedural rule was instituted after the conduct
giving rise to the suit does not make application of the
rule at trial retroactive.  Cf. McBurney v. Carson, 99
U. S. 567, 569 (1879).
  Petitioner relies principally upon Bradley v. Richmond
School Bd., 416 U. S. 696 (1969), and Thorpe v. Housing
Authority of Durham, 393 U. S. 268 (1969), in support
of her argument that our ordinary interpretive rules
support application of 102 to her case.  In Thorpe, we
held that an agency circular requiring a local housing
authority to give notice of reasons and opportunity to
respond before evicting a tenant was applicable to an
eviction proceeding commenced before the regulation
issued.  Thorpe shares much with both the -procedural-
and -prospective-relief- cases.  See supra, at 29-31.
Thus, we noted in Thorpe that new hearing procedures
did not affect either party's obligations under the lease
agreement between the housing authority and the
petitioner, 393 U. S., at 279, and, because the tenant
had  -not yet vacated,- we saw no significance in the
fact that the housing authority had -decided to evict her
before the circular was issued,- id. at 283.  The Court
in Thorpe viewed the new eviction procedures as
-essential to remove a serious impediment to the
successful protection of constitutional rights.-  Id., at
283.  Cf. Youakim v. Miller, 425 U. S. 231, 237 (1976)
(per curiam) (citing Thorpe for propriety of applying new
law to avoiding necessity of deciding constitutionality of
old one).
  Our holding in Bradley is similarly compatible with
the line of decisions disfavoring -retroactive- application
of statutes.  In Bradley, the District Court had awarded
attorney's fees and costs, upon general equitable princi-
ples, to parents who had prevailed in an action seeking
to desegregate the public schools of Richmond, Virginia.
While the case was pending before the Court of Appeals,
Congress enacted 718 of the Education Amendments of
1972, which authorized federal courts to award the
prevailing parties in school desegregation cases a
reasonable attorney's fee.  The Court of Appeals held
that the new fee provision did not authorize the award
of fees for services rendered before the effective date of
the amendments.  This Court reversed.  We concluded
that the private parties could rely on 718 to support
their claim for attorney's fees, resting our decision -on
the principle that a court is to apply the law in effect at
the time it renders its decision, unless doing so would
result in manifest injustice or there is statutory direc-
tion or legislative history to the contrary.-  416 U. S., at
711.
  Although that language suggests a categorical pre-
sumption in favor of application of all new rules of law,
we now make it clear that Bradley did not alter the
well-settled presumption against application of the class
of new statutes that would have genuinely -retroactive-
effect.  Like the new hearing requirement in Thorpe, the
attorney's fee provision at issue in Bradley did not
resemble the cases in which we have invoked the
presumption against statutory retroactivity.  Attorney's
fee determinations, we have observed, are -collateral to
the main cause of action- and -uniquely separable from
the cause of action to be proved at trial.-  White v. New
Hampshire Dept. of Employment Security, 455 U. S. 445,
451-452 (1982).  See also Hutto v. Finney, 437  U. S.
678, 695, n. 24 (1978).  Moreover, even before the enact-
ment of 718, federal courts had authority (which the
District Court in Bradley had exercised) to award fees
based upon equitable principles.  As our opinion in
Bradley made clear, it would be difficult to imagine a
stronger equitable case for an attorney's fee award than
a lawsuit in which the plaintiff parents would otherwise
have to bear the costs of desegregating their children's
public schools.  See 416 U. S., at 718 (noting that the
plaintiffs had brought the school board -into compliance
with its constitutional mandate-) (citing Brown v. Board
of Education, 347 U. S. 483, 494 (1954)).  In light of the
prior availability of a fee award, and the likelihood that
fees would be assessed under pre-existing theories, we
concluded that the new fee statute simply -did not im-
pose an additional or unforeseeable obligation- upon the
school board.  Bradley, 416 U. S., at 721.
  In approving application of the new fee provision,
Bradley did not take issue with the long line of deci-
sions applying the presumption against retroactivity.
Our opinion distinguished, but did not criticize, prior
cases that had applied the anti-retroactivity canon.  See
416 U. S., at 720 (citing Greene v. United States, 376 U.
S. 149, 160 (1964); Claridge Apartments Co. v. Commis-
sioner, 323 U. S. 141, 164 (1944), and Union Pacific R.
Co. v. Laramie Stock Yards Co., 231 U. S. 190, 199
(1913)).  The authorities we relied upon in Bradley lend
further support to the conclusion that we did not intend
to displace the traditional presumption against applying
statutes affecting substantive rights, liabilities, or duties
to conduct arising before their enactment.  See Kaiser,
494 U. S., at 849-850 (Scalia, J., concurring).  Bradley
relied on Thorpe and on other precedents that are con-
sistent with a presumption against statutory retroac-
tivity, including decisions involving explicitly retroactive
statutes, see 416 U. S., at 713, n. 17 (citing, inter alia,
Freeborn v. Smith, 2 Wall. 160 (1865)), the retroac-
tive application of intervening judicial decisions, see 416
U. S., at 713-714, n. 17 (citing, inter alia, Patterson v.
Alabama, 294 U. S. 600, 607 (1935)), statutes alter-
ing jurisdiction, 416 U. S., at 713, n. 17 (citing, inter
alia, United States v. Alabama, 362 U. S. 602 (1960)),
and repeal of a criminal statute, 416 U. S., at 713,
n. 17 (citing United States v. Chambers 291 U. S. 217
(1934)).  Moreover, in none of our decisions that have
relied upon Bradley or Thorpe have we cast doubt on
the traditional presumption against truly -retrospective-
application of a statute.
  When a case implicates a federal statute enacted after
the events in suit, the court's first task is to determine
whether Congress has expressly prescribed the statute's
proper reach.  If Congress has done so, of course, there
is no need to resort to judicial default rules.  When,
however, the statute contains no such express command,
the court must determine whether the new statute
would have retroactive effect, i.e., whether it would
impair rights a party possessed when he acted, increase
a party's liability for past conduct, or impose new duties
with respect to transactions already completed.  If the
statute would operate retroactively, our traditional
presumption teaches that it does not govern absent clear
congressional intent favoring such a result.

                            V
  We now ask whether, given the absence of guiding
instructions from Congress,  102 of the Civil Rights Act
of 1991 is the type of provision that should govern cases
arising before its enactment.  As we observed supra, at
15, there is no special reason to think that all the
diverse provisions of the Act must be treated uniformly
for such purposes.  To the contrary, we understand the
instruction that the provisions are to -take effect upon
enactment- to mean that courts should evaluate each
provision of the Act in light of ordinary judicial princi-
ples concerning the application of new rules to pending
cases and pre-enactment conduct.
  Two provisions of 102 may be readily classified ac-
cording to these principles.  The jury trial right set out
in 102(c)(1) is plainly a procedural change of the sort
that would ordinarily govern in trials conducted after its
effective date.  If 102 did no more than introduce a
right to jury trial in Title VII cases, the provision would
presumably apply to cases tried after November 21,
1991, regardless of when the underlying conduct
occurred.  However, because 102(c) makes a jury
trial available only -[i]f a complaining party seeks com-
pensatory or punitive damages,- the jury trial option
must stand or fall with the attached damages provi-
sions.
  Section 102(b)(1) is clearly on the other side of the
line.  That subsection authorizes punitive damages if
the plaintiff shows that the defendant -engaged in a
discriminatory practice or discriminatory practices with
malice or with reckless indifference to the federally
protected rights of an aggrieved individual.-  The very
labels given -punitive- or -exemplary- damages, as well
as the rationales that support them, demonstrate that
they share key characteristics of criminal sanctions.
Retroactive imposition of punitive damages would raise
a serious constitutional question.  See Turner Elkhorn,
428 U. S., at 17 (Court would -hesitate to approve the
retrospective imposition of liability on any theory of
deterrence . . . or blameworthiness-); De Veau v.
Braisted, 363 U. S. 144, 160 (1960) (-The mark of an ex
post facto law is the imposition of what can fairly be
designated punishment for past acts-).  See also Louis
Vuitton S. A. v. Spencer Handbags Corp., 765 F. 2d 966,
972 (CA2 1985) (retroactive application of punitive
treble damages provisions of Trademark Counterfeiting
Act of 1984 -would present a potential ex post facto
problem-).  Before we entertained that question, we
would have to be confronted with a statute that explic-
itly authorized punitive damages for preenactment con-
duct.   The Civil Rights Act of 1991 contains no such
explicit command.
  The provision of 102(a)(1) authorizing the recovery of
compensatory damages is not easily classified.  It does
not make unlawful conduct that was lawful when it
occurred; as we have noted, supra, at 6-8, 102 only
reaches discriminatory conduct already prohibited by
Title VII.  Concerns about a lack of fair notice are
further muted by the fact that such discrimination was
in many cases (although not this one) already subject to
monetary liability in the form of backpay.  Nor could
anyone seriously contend that the compensatory dam-
ages provisions smack of a -retributive- or other suspect
legislative purpose.  Section 102 reflects Congress' desire
to afford victims of discrimination more complete redress
for violations of rules established more than a genera-
tion ago in the Civil Rights Act of 1964.  At least with
respect to its compensatory damages provisions, then,
102 is not in a category in which objections to retroac-
tive application on grounds of fairness have their great-
est force.
  Nonetheless, the new compensatory damages provision
would operate -retrospectively- if it were applied to
conduct occurring before November 21, 1991.  Unlike
certain other forms of relief, compensatory damages are
quintessentially backward-looking.  Compensatory dam-
ages may be intended less to sanction wrongdoers than
to make victims whole, but they do so by a mechanism
that affects the liabilities of defendants.  They do not
-compensate- by distributing funds from the public
coffers, but by requiring particular employers to pay for
harms they caused.  The introduction of a right to
compensatory damages is also the type of legal change
that would have an impact on private parties'
planning.  In this case, the event to which the new
damages provision relates is the discriminatory conduct
of respondents' agent John Williams; if applied here,
that provision would attach an important new legal
burden to that conduct.  The new damages remedy in
102, we conclude, is the kind of provision that does not
apply to events antedating its enactment in the absence
of clear congressional intent.
  In cases like this one, in which prior law afforded no
relief, 102 can be seen as creating a new cause of
action, and its impact on parties' rights is especially
pronounced.  Section 102 confers a new right to monetary
relief on persons like petitioner who were victims of a
hostile work environment but were not constructively
discharged, and the novel prospect of damages liability
for their employers.  Because Title VII previously autho-
rized recovery of backpay in some cases, and because
compensatory damages under 102(a) are in addition to
any backpay recoverable, the new provision also resem-
bles a statute increasing the amount of damages avail-
able under a preestablished cause of action.  Even
under that view, however, the provision would, if ap-
plied in cases arising before the Act's effective date,
undoubtedly impose on employers found liable a -new
disability- in respect to past events.  See Society for
Propagation of the Gospel, 22 F. Cas., at 767.  The
extent of a party's liability, in the civil context as well
as the criminal, is an important legal consequence that
cannot be ignored.  Neither in Bradley itself, nor in
any case before or since in which Congress had not
clearly spoken, have we read a statute substantially
increasing the monetary liability of a private party to
apply to conduct occurring before the statute's enact-
ment.  See Winfree v. Northern Pacific R. Co., 227 U. S.
296, 301 (1913) (statute creating new federal cause of
action for wrongful death inapplicable to case arising
before enactment in absence of -explicit words- or -clear
implication-); United States Fidelity & Guaranty Co. v.
United States ex rel. Struthers Wells Co., 209 U. S. 306,
314-315 (1908) (construing statute restricting
subcontractors' rights to recover damages from prime
contractors as prospective in absence of -clear, strong
and imperative- language from Congress favoring retro-
activity).
  It will frequently be true, as petitioner and amici
forcefully argue here, that retroactive application of a
new statute would vindicate its purpose more fully.
That consideration, however, is not sufficient to rebut
the presumption against retroactivity.  Statutes are
seldom crafted to pursue a single goal, and compromises
necessary to their enactment may require adopting
means other than those that would most effectively
pursue the main goal.  A legislator who supported a
prospective statute might reasonably oppose retroactive
application of the same statute.  Indeed, there is reason
to believe that the omission of the 1990 version's ex-
press retroactivity provisions was a factor in the pas-
sage of the 1991 bill.  Section 102 is plainly not the
sort of provision that must be understood to operate
retroactively because a contrary reading would render it
ineffective.
  The presumption against statutory retroactivity is
founded upon sound considerations of general policy and
practice, and accords with long held and widely shared
expectations about the usual operation of legislation.
We are satisfied that it applies to 102.  Because we
have found no clear evidence of congressional intent
that 102 of the Civil Rights Act of 1991 should apply
to cases arising before its enactment, we conclude that
the judgment of the Court of Appeals must be affirmed.

                                      It is so ordered.